Rights of Creditors to Reach Assets of a Revocable Trust after the Death of the Grantor - The Missouri Approach by Johnson, J. Rodney
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Law Faculty Publications School of Law
1985
Rights of Creditors to Reach Assets of a Revocable
Trust after the Death of the Grantor - The Missouri
Approach
J. Rodney Johnson
University of Richmond, rjohnson@richmond.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/law-faculty-publications
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rights of Creditors to Reach Assets of a Revocable Trust after the Death of the Grantor - The Missouri Approach, 20 Real Prop., Prob.
and Trust J. 1189 (1985).
fonoR's SvNors1s: The question whether creditors of a decedent's estate can reach 
the assets of an inter vivas trust is difficult. This article discusses the answers 
reached in various situations, and also a recent Missouri statute that allows the 
trustee to limit the time for creditors' claims. · 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Revocable inter vivos trusts (herein referred to as "revocable trusts," 
although the trust normally becomes irrevocable on the death of the 
grantor) in recent years have been used more frequently as an estate 
planning vehicle, often replacing the will for making a disposition of assets 
at death. 
There are clearly defined rights of creditors against a probate estate. 
Most states have a specific period oftime during which a probate creditor's 
claim must be filed or be forever barred; these periods vary from two 
months to 12 months or more. Assets held in a revocable trust at death do 
not require probate administration. If there is no probate administration, 
the creditor procedures applicable to probate generally do not apply. This 
report will discuss a Missouri statute enacted in 1983 and other statutory 
and case law relating to the rights of creditors to reach assets of a revocable 
trust upon the death of the grantor. 
II. MISSOURI STATUTE 
In 1983, the Missouri Legislature, as part of a new trust law,1 enacted 
section 456.610, which provides as follows: 
1. Any trustee who has a duty or power to pay the debts of a decedent may 
publish a notice in some newspaper published in the county once a week for 
four consecutive weeks in substantially the following form: 
2. All persons interested in the estate of , decedent. 
The undersigned is acting as trustee under a trust, the 
terms of which provide that the debts of the decedent may be paid by the 
*Report of Probate and Trust Committee D-2, Formation, Administration and Distribu-
tion of Trusts. 
'Mo. REv. STAT. § 456.010-456.820. 
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trustee(s) upon receipt of prope~ proof thereof. The address of the trustee is 
. . . All creditors of the decedent are noticed to prese 
their claims to the undersigned within six (6) months from the date off' nt 
bl . t' f h' · 1rst pu 1ca ion o t 1s notice or be forever barred. 
Trustee 
If such p~bl'.cat~on is duly made by the trustee, any debts not presented to the 
trustee within six months from the date of the first publication of the afore ·d 
notice shall be forever barred against the trustee and the trust propert s.ai 
This is a unique type of statute dealing with a difficult area of 1:w 2 
Th~ Missouri statute assumes that creditors of a decedent can rea~h 
assets in a revocable trust created by the decedent. Its application · 
I .. d h IS 1m1te tot ose trusts which provide that the trustee has a duty or power to 
pay d~bts of the decedent. The statute's applicability thus depends on the 
wording of the trust. It presumably relates to a trust of which the decedent 
was the granto:'. but "decedent" is not defined and might include a 
~e~eased beneficiary of the trust, who is not the grantor. The statute is not 
limited to re.vocable trusts. It might apply to an irrevocable trust where the 
grantor retained, for example, an income interest. This article will discuss 
the Missouri statute only in the context of a revocable inter vivas trust on 
the death of the grantor. 
The statute does not require actual notice to known creditors but 
merely a pub~ished not~ce. Publication of notice is discretionary with the 
tru.stee. Published notice, however, may not satisfy constitutional re-
qwrements.3 
. The statute d~es give th~ trustees some protection in making distribu-
tions after the period for claims has expired, but it may delay distributions 
where there are no creditors. Failure to publish the notice to invoke a short 
statute of limitations might subject the trustee to liability for failure to 
protect the beneficiaries' interests. 
The Missouri statute does not limit its application to transfers into trust 
which were a fraud on creditors. It is not part of a comprehensive statute 
dealin.g "'.it~ creditors' rights in all nonprobate assets, such as pension 
benefits, Joint tenancy, tenancy by the entirety, life insurance, and Totten 
trusts. It creates a special statute of limitations, if the trust provides for 
payment of debts and if the trustee elects to publish the notice to creditors. 
2The Committee has surveyed the laws of all other states and the District of Columbia and 
has not located a similar type statute in any other jurisdiction. 
. ~Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); Mennonite Bd. of 
M1ss1ons v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983); Continental Ins. Co. v. Moseley, 463 U.S. 1202 (1983); 
on remand, 683 P.2d 20 (Nev. 1984) (Moseley requires actual notice to known creditors). 
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A statute, such as the Missouri statute, would have broader appeal if it 
applied to all revocable trusts on the death of the grantor, whether or not 
there was a power or direction to pay debts and whether or not the trust 
has a spendthrift clause. Ideally the statute should set forth a procedure for 
acting on claims or rejecting claims. Presumably if a claim is rejected, suit 
would be brought against the trustee under the applicable statutes of that 
jurisdiction. Any period for filing of creditors' claims against a revocable 
trust shou Id correspond to the period provided under the laws of that state 
for filing creditors' claims against a probate estate. The statute does not 
provide for priority of payment. Should claims first be satisfied from 
probate assets and then from trust assets? Should priority among trust 
creditors be the same as among probate creditors? 
There are a number of other will substitutes, such as joint tenancy, 
Totten trusts, insurance contracts, and pension benefits, each of which 
raises questions as to the rights of creditors .. of a decedent to reach assets 
held in that form.4 A comprehensive statutory solution would be of assist-
ance. 
m. CRrnnoRs' R1ci-ITs GENER.An v 
ON DEATH Of THE GRANTOR Of A REVOCABLE TRUST 
The extent to which the assets of a revocable trust can be reached by 
the creditors of the grantor on the grantor's death varies from state to 
state.' Creditors' rights may depend upon a power of revocation, a power 
of appointment, statutory provisions, fraudulent transfers in trust, or the 
power of a personal representative to recover assets necessary to pay 
creditors in a probate estate. 
A. Power of Revocation 
An early Supreme Court case held that a transfer in trust, where the 
transferor held a power of revocation and where there was no fraud in the 
transfer itself, could not be set aside by a creditor. The Court reasoned that 
the power to revoke was not an interest in the property as such. 6 In the 
absence of a statute otherwise providing, the courts have generally taken 
the view that the mere fact that the settlor or grantor has a power to revoke 
the trust does not subject him to a duty to his creditors to do so for their 
benefit, nor does it make him the owner of the property so that creditors 
can treat it as his property. This view has been reflected in the Restatement 
of Trusts. 7 A power of revocation held by the grantor obviously expires on 
45ee Effland, Rights of Creditors in Nonprobate Assets, 48 Mo. L. REV. 431 (1983). 
51 CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING § 5.5.9, n. 47 (5th ed. 1984) 
'Jones v. Clifton, 101 U.S. 225 (1879); also see cases cited in 4 Scon, TRUSTS§ 330.12 n. 5 
(3d ed. 1967). 
'RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 330, Comment o. The Comment states as follows: 
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t~e grantor'~ death. l_f the creditors cannot force revocation durin I" 
time, the:e is no basis for assuming that creditors have a ri ht tog ife-
property in the revocable trust after the grantor's death lg reach 
confers such a right. ' un ess a statute 
Statutory Provisions Favoring Creditors of 
a Revocable 
. Ne~ York a_nd a number of other jurisdictions have enacted stat ~~~~\g~veNcredy1torks specific righ'.s in property transferred to a revoc~~~: 
· e ew or statute provides as follows: 
Where a creator reserves an unqualified power of revocation . 
absoluteh owner of the property disposed of so far as the right~~~ ~i~:~~~~tthe 
or pure asers are concerned.' ors 
There are similar statutes in a number of other states 'New y k I 
has interpreted the New York statute to allow a cr~ditor ofo: d case aw 
g;atn~or ~ith an insolvent estate to reach assets of a revocable tru~~~oa;~d 
s a u_ es reque~tly, however, do not address the issue of wheth~r t e 
cre?1tors have nghts to recover property after the death of th he ~yh~~:t~~~~~ g~~es the credit?rs the right to co~pel rev~cat7og:~~t~;~~~ 
However it has been ~~~er if nhecessary to satisfy creditor obligations. 
h ' e t e power to revoke expires at d th d 
t erefore creditors after the grantor's death cannot reach the trustaasse:s~12 
C. Cases a Creditor's Rights to Assets 
After Death 
In State Street Bank & Trust c R · 
court made the f II . b ~- v. e1ser, a Massachusetts appellate 
o owing o servat1on: 
Where a person places property in trust and reserves the ri ht to a ;;:~;,k~l~;~~n~r~c; ~i;~t~s~~ot~~f!~~~~~~~~:~~ ii~c~a~:fa~~~os:~~o;~: cE~:!~~: 
Unless it is otherwise provided by statute a . 
cannot be reached by his creditors. If he r:vof~~~r of revocation reserved by the settlor 
the creditors can reach the property· but th e trust and re~overs the trust property, 
their benefit. ' ey cannot compel him to revoke the trust for 
:N.Y. ESTATES, Powrns & TRUST lAw, § 10-10.6 
4 Scorr, TRusTs § 330.12, n. 8 (3d ed. 1967) For . . 
When the grantor in a conveyance reserves t~ hi example, the Minnesota statute provides: ~f revocation, such grantor is still the absol mself, for hrs own benefit, an absolute right 
rights of creditors and purchasers are concu;~n~~ner of the estate conveyed, so far as the 
MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 502.76. Kansas has a simil t . . . 
STAT. ANN. § 58-2414. ar ype statute limited to grantors of lands. KAN. 
iofnreGranwell,20N.Y.2d91 228N E 2d 
ky, ~; Misc.2d 70, 404 N.Y.S.2d S10, 511 (19::i~, 281 N.Y.S.2d783{1967); EstateofChaikows-
OH10 REV. CoOE § 1335.01. 
12Schofield v. Cleveland Trust Co., 135 Ohio St. 328, 21 N.E.2d 119 (1939). 
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debts to them, to the extent not satisfied by the settlor's estate, those assets 
owned by the trust over which the settlor had such control at the time of his 
death as would have enabled the settlor to use the trust assets for his own 
benefit. 13 
For a contrary view, see Greenwich Trust Company v. Tyson, a Con-
necticut Supreme Court case. 14 
Power of Revocation as a General Power of Appointment 
Where the grantor of a trust reserves unto himself or herself a general 
power of appointment there is authority that creditors can reach the 
property in the trust even after the death of the grantor who held the 
power, if other assets are insufficient to satisfy creditors' claims. 15 
E. Fraudulent Transfers 
Some states have applied the concept of fraudulent conveyances to 
transfers in trust as a basis for allowing creditors to reach assets of a 
revocable trust. For example, Kansas provides as follows: 
Every gift, grant or conveyance of
1 
lands, tenements, hereditaments, rents, 
goods or chattels, and every bond, judgment or execution, made or obtained 
with intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors of their just and lawful debts 
or damages, or to defraud or to deceive the person or persons who shall 
purchase such lands, tenements, hereditaments, rents, goods or chattels, 
shall be deemed utterly void and of no effect. 16 
This statute has allowed creditors to reach assets of a trust. 17 
North Dakota has a statute on fraudulent transfers, which provides as 
follows: 
Every transfer of property or charge made thereon, every obligation incurred, 
and every judicial proceeding taken, with intent to delay or defraud any 
creditor or other person of his demands, whether or not the same is valid as 
between the paries thereto, is void as against all creditors of the debtor and 
137 Mass. App. Ct. 633, 638, 389 N.E.2d 768, 771 (1979). For a similar result see Johnson v. 
Comm. Bank, 284 Ore. 675, 588 P.2d 1096 (1978). 
14129 Conn. 211, 27 A.2d 166 (1942). 
15RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 328. A statute of this type is California Civil Code § 1390.4, 
which provides: 
Property subject to an unexercised general power of appointment created by the donor in 
favor of himself, whether or not presently exercisable, is subject to the claims of creditors 
of the donor or of his estate and to the expenses of the administration of his estate. 
Also, see discussion in 2 Scorr, TRUSTS § 156 (3d ed. 1967). 
16l<AN. STAT. ANN. § 33-102 (1981). 
17Kansas also has a statute dealing with nonfraudulent transfers of personal property 
which provides: 
All gifts and conveyances of goods and chattels, made in trust to the use of the person or 
persons making the same shall, to the full extent of both the corpus and income made in 
trust to such use, be void and of no effect, regardless of motive, as to all past, present or 
future creditors; but otherwise shall be valid and effective. KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 33-101 (1981). 
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their successors in interest and against all persons upon whom the estate of 
the debtor devolves in trust for the benefit of others than the debtor.18 
1 
T~es: statutes generally apply to rights of creditors during the gran-
t?r s lifot1me but, as discussed in the next section, personal representa-
tives are often given the right to recover assets on behalf of estate credi-
tors. These statutes and others are based upon the Uniform Fraudule t 
Conveyance_ Act and in particular sections 6 and 7 thereof. Both refer~ 
transfers being fraudulent as to both present and future creditors.19 
F. Rights of Creditors and Personal Representative to 
Recover Assets After Grantor's Death 
. A nu.mber of states provide for recovery by the personal representa-
tive ~nd 1n som: cases by the creditors of assets transferred in fraud of 
creditors. In Indiana, the .real and personal property liable forthe payment 
of debts of a decedent includes all property transferred with intent to 
defraud creditors. The exclusive right to recover assets transferred in fraud 
of creditors is given to the personal representative. Fraudulent con-
veyances may include the rights of subsequent creditors. 20 
Arkansas authorizes a personal representative of a grantor who has 
made transfers with intent to delay or defraud his creditors to bring an 
ac~ion to set aside the transfer, recover the assets for the estate and use 
said assets to pay creditors. 21 
18N.D. CENT. CODE§ 13-01-05. 
"The UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CoNVEYANCEACT has been adopted in at least26 states 7A u LA 
161. I • " " 
Section 6 provides: 
Every conveyance made and every obligation incurred without fair consideration when the 
p~rson making the conveyance or entering into the obligation intends or believes that he 
will incur debts beyond his ability to pay as they mature, is fraudulent as to both present and 
future creditors. 
Section 7 provides: 
Every. conveyance made and every obligation incurred with actual intent, as distinguished 
from intent presumed 1n law, to hinder, delay, or defraud either present orfuture creditors, 
1s fraudulent as to both present and future creditors. 
'°IND. CoDE § 32-2-1-15 provides in part: 
All deeds of gift, conveyances, transfers of assignments ... of goods or things in action, 
made in trust for the use of the person making the same, shall be void as against creditors, 
existing or subsequent, of such person. 
On the death of a party, creditors' rights are defined in IND. CoDE § 29-1-13-4 as fol-
lows: 
The real and personal property liable for the payments of debts of a decedent shall include 
all property transferred by him with intent to defraud his creditors or any of them, or 
transferred by any other means which is in law void as against his creditors or any of them· 
and the right to recover such property, so far as necessary for the payment of the debts of 
the decedent, shall be 1n the personal representative, who shall take such steps as may be 
necessary.to recover the same. Such property shall constitute general assets of the payment 
of all creditors; but no property so transferred shall be taken from anyone who purchased it 
fo~1 : _val~~bl~ con:1~:r:~1~_n, in good faith and without knowledge of the fraud. 
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Wisconsin, in addition to allowing the personal representative to 
bring suit to recover assets, also allows creditors to bring suit to recover 
assets that may be liable for debts of the decedent. 22 
A California statute authorizes the personal representative to recover 
assets for estate creditors if there was intent to defraud creditors, avoid 
obligations or where a gift was made in view of death resulting in a 
deficiency of assets to pay creditors.23 
G. Augmented Estate 
Although not directly applicable, the Uniform Probate Cod~ in section 
2-202 provides that assets in a revocable trust will be taken into account in 
determining the surviving spouse's statutory share of the estate. This is the 
augmented estate concept. A Massachusetts court has applied this con-
cept of including assets in a revocable trust in determining a surviving 
spouse's statutory rights in the estate. 24 
The Uniform Probate Code also gives those interested in a decedent's 
estate certain rights in multiple party accounts to pay taxes, family allow-
ance and other obligations.25 
IV. AN APPROACH 
The Missouri statute highlights the problems relating to rights of 
creditors in assets held in a revocable trust. The Missouri statute is only a 
statute of limitation. It appears to be optional and is dependent upon the 
trustee having power to pay debts or expenses. If the trustee does not 
expect to pay debts from the trust, the publication of notice to creditors 
would seem inappropriate. The obligation to pay debts is not restricted to 
debts not paid through probate. It obviously singles out assets in a revo-
cable trust from other non probate assets and gives them special protection 
from creditors. Standing alone, section 456.610 of the Missouri trust stat-
ute represents only a first step in dealing with creditors' rights in nonpro-
bate assets. 
An approach to creditors reaching revocable trust assets is to provide 
by statute, as do a number of states, that assets in a revocable trust are 
subject to creditors' claims, if probate assets are insufficient to satisfy all 
claims. The personal representative of a decedent's probate estate, to the 
22w1s. PROB. CoDE § 859.40; N.Y. Surr. Ct. Proc. Act§ 1810 apparently gives the creditor the 
choice of proceeding on a creditor's claim against both probate and trust assets. 
23 CALIF. PROB. CoDE § 579. This section provides: 
If the decedent, in his lifetime, conveyed any real or personal property, or any right or 
interest therein, with intent to defraud his creditors, or to avoid any obligation due another, 
or made a conveyance that by law is void as against creditors, or made a gift of property in 
view of death, and there is a deficiency of assets in the hands of the executor or administra-
tor, the latter, on application of any creditor, must commence and prosecute to final 
judgment an action for the recovery of the same for the benefit of the creditors. 
24Sullivan v. Burkin, 390 Mass. 864, 460 N.E.2d 572 (1984). 
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extent the decedent's probate assets are insufficient to satisfy creditors' 
claims, should be authorized to recover on behalf of probate estate credi-
tors assets in a revocable trust created by the decedent, as well as other 
nonprobate assets. In the event there is no probate proceeding, then a 
statute, such as the Missouri statute, allowing publication of a notice of 
death by the trustee and requiring claims to be filed against the trust within 
a short period of time, such as six months, would be an appropriate 
alternate procedure, if, but only if, creditors in that jurisdiction can other-
wise reach assets of a revocable trust to satisfy claims. In the majority of 
jurisdictions which protect assets in a revocable trust from creditors, 
assuming no fraudulent conveyance, then the Missouri statute would be 
inappropriate. 
The laws of a particular jurisdiction as to creditors' rights in probate 
assets, in revocable trust assets, and in other non probate assets should be 
carefully coordinated to clearly define rights and procedures in all assets at 
death. The Missouri statute touches an aspect of creditors' rights in a 
revocable trust, but those rights require further clarification in most juri~;­
dictions. Enactment of the Missouri statute of limitation would seem advis-
able only in those jurisdictions which give creditoh a direct cause of action 
against revocable trust assets on a decedent's death. 
The creditor aspects of non probate assets, including those assets held 
in a revocable trust, require greater study than has been done by this 
Committee. A study by the American Law Institute or a uniform law on 
creditors' rights in nonprobate assets would seem appropriate. 
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